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As U.S. farm income from tobacco production has declined in recent years, there has 
been increased interest in developing alternative sources of farm revenue to replace lost tobacco 
income, particularly in tobacco-dependent communities of the southeastern United States.  The 
recent end of the tobacco quota program is expected to accelerate the exit of tobacco farmers and 
has heightened concern regarding the availability of profitable substitutes for tobacco.  In this 
study, we examine the impact of farm, household, and market characteristics on tobacco farmer 
interest and success in on-farm and off-farm income diversification.  Using survey data collected 
from a panel of North Carolina tobacco farmers in 1997, 1999, 2001, and 2004 combined with 
market data collected from secondary sources, we evaluate the influence of farmer preferences, 
resource endowments, market incentives, risk, and biophysical factors on tobacco farmers’ 
attitudes regarding diversification into non-tobacco products, the extent to which they reallocated 
resources towards non-tobacco products, and their success in identifying profitable alternatives 
to tobacco production.  Our research contributes empirical findings to the public dialogue 
concerning the ability of tobacco farmers and tobacco-dependent communities to adjust to 
structural changes taking place in the tobacco market. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Major structural changes have occurred in the U.S. tobacco market in recent years, 
including increased production costs; a rapid rise in the proportion of tobacco grown under 
contract with manufacturers; sharp reductions in tobacco marketing quotas that reflect declining 
demand for domestic tobacco, and, most recently, termination of the tobacco quota system and 
price support program, in October 2004.1  These developments have also contributed to 
significant changes in tobacco-dependent communities.   
Tobacco is grown in over 500 U.S. counties in 23 states, although production is 
concentrated in the Southern states of North Carolina, Kentucky, Virginia, Tennessee, South 
Carolina, and Georgia (USDA NASS, 2004).  As the number of tobacco farms along with 
income from tobacco has declined, there has been increased interest in developing alternative 
sources of income, particularly in tobacco-dependent communities (Gale, 1999; Gale, Foreman, 
and Capehart, 2000; President’s Commission, 2001; Hull, 2002).   
Primary reasons for reductions in demand for domestic tobacco are reduced cigarette 
consumption because of higher cigarette excise taxes, higher cigarette prices to cover industry 
payments under settlement agreements, and antismoking efforts as well as increasing industry 
reliance on lower-cost imported tobacco.  Removal of tobacco quotas and the federal tobacco 
price support program will bring U.S. tobacco prices closer to world prices making it more 
competitive in global markets.  It will also allow geographic relocation of tobacco production 
(prior to the tobacco quota buyout, quotas could not be transferred across county lines, except for 
                                                 
1 Effective quota for flue-cured tobacco nationally declined from 925 million pounds in 1995 to 
536 million pounds in 2003, a 42 percent decline during the time period covered by our 
survey data collection.     3 
burley tobacco in Tennessee).  These changes are expected to speed the transition to fewer, 
larger farms that has taken place throughout agriculture, but which has been slowed in tobacco 
by the quota program.  Many smaller and older tobacco farmers are likely to exit the market 
following the buyout (Tiller, 2003) and there may be some overall reallocation of flue-cured 
tobacco production towards the high-yield regions of eastern North and South Carolina and 
southern Georgia (Gale, Foreman, and Capehart, 2000).  However, the end of the tobacco quota 
program is expected to accelerate the exit of tobacco farmers even in North Carolina, which 
accounts for approximately 40 percent of national production and is particularly well-suited for 
tobacco production.  In our most recent survey of North Carolina tobacco farmers, conducted in 
early 2004, about a third of the respondents indicated they would stop growing tobacco if there 
were a quota buyout.   
Farmers and quota holders will be receiving buyout payments over the next 10 years, but 
the majority will receive relatively little.  It is estimated that the top 20 percent of recipients will 
receive about 80 percent of the total payments (EWG, 2005).  Many farmers will be looking for 
alternative income sources, which has heightened concern regarding the availability of profitable 
substitutes for tobacco.  The influx of buyout funds into tobacco-dependent communities could 
provide an opportunity for investment in new enterprises, but it has proven difficult in the past to 
identify sufficiently profitable alternatives to tobacco.  Altman et al (1996) reported that their 
survey of tobacco farmers throughout the South found that 78 percent of tobacco farmers 
growing flue-cured tobacco and 69 percent of those growing burley tobacco identified the lower 
profits associated with alternatives to tobacco as a barrier to diversification.  Our surveys of 
North Carolina flue-cured tobacco farmers revealed an even higher proportion identifying the   4 
lower profitability of alternative crops as a barrier, with about 87 percent of respondents noting 
this as an issue. 
In this study, we examine the impact of farm, household, and market characteristics on 
farmer interest and success in diversification into non-tobacco income. A panel of North 
Carolina tobacco farmers was surveyed in 1997, 1999, 2001, and 2004. Information elicited 
included tobacco production, attitudes, knowledge and behaviors regarding on-farm 
diversification, off-farm employment, tobacco manufacturers, tobacco control, and other key 
issues.  These data were first collected prior to major upheavals in the tobacco market that have 
taken place since 1997. Data collection has continued to the present and includes events such as 
the approval of the Master Settlement Agreement between the large tobacco companies and the 
attorneys general of 46 states in 1998, increasing use of imported tobacco, huge reductions in 
tobacco quotas, rapid growth in contracting, and serious discussion regarding a tobacco buyout 
(our most recent survey took place prior to approval of the buyout bill).   
This unique longitudinal dataset was combined with local market data to evaluate the 
influence of farmer preferences, resource endowments, market incentives, risk, and biophysical 
factors on tobacco farmers’ attitudes regarding actual diversification into non-tobacco 
enterprises, attempts to diversify, and success in identifying profitable alternatives to tobacco.  
This research contributes empirical findings to the public dialogue concerning the ability of 
tobacco farmers and tobacco-dependent communities to adjust to the major structural changes 
taking place.   5 
THEORETICAL MODEL 
Following the structure of Coxhead, Shively, and Shuai (2002), we assume that farmers 
seek to maximize the net present value of a stream of expected utility subject to time, production 
function, and budget constraints.  Agricultural households have the objective function 
(1)  max  dt t EU e
T
rt ) ( ∫
0
-  
where r is the discount rate and the interval [0,T] defines the planning horizon.  Because prices 
and yields are stochastic, agricultural household utility depends on the expected level of 
consumption, C, and its variance as well as time available for leisure, Tl, conditioned on 
household-specific characteristics denoted by Zh: 
(2)  EU=U(E(C), Var(C), Tl; Zh) 










.  The farm household uses their 
endowments of family labor, land, and land quality to produce a combination of outputs in each 
period under the following constraints:   
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where  
T  =  total time available to household 
Tf  =  household time allocated to farm labor 
To  =  household time allocated to off-farm labor 
Tl  =  household time allocated to “leisure”2 
Q  =  vector of farm outputs 
N  =  land area  
Hf  =  hired labor used on farm 
                                                 
2 Includes time spent on activities other than on-farm and off-farm work, which includes child 
care, household chores, and other activities in addition to leisure.   6 
X  =  vector of inputs to farm production other than labor and land 
ε  =  production risk 
pq  =  vector of farm output prices 
wo  =  off-farm labor wage 
V  =  non-labor income 
wx  =  vector of farm input prices other than labor 
wh  =  hired agricultural labor wage 
wn  =  land price 
pc  =  price vector for consumption goods 
C  =  vector of consumption goods 
 
 
It is assumed that there are two sources of uncertainty, prices and production.  Prices at 
harvest are unknown when acreage allocation decisions are made (though input prices are 
observed).  Production risk arises from the characteristics of the land and labor endowments as 
well as external events such as weather, disease, and insect infestation.  Assuming no joint 
production, the production function for each output is assumed to be: 
(6)  ) , , , , ( i i fi fi i i i X H T N Q Q e =  
where Ni is area planted to the ith crop, Tfi is household labor devoted to farming the ith crop, Hfi 
is hired labor devoted to farming the ith crop, Xi is a vector of variable inputs (fertilizer, 
chemicals, etc.) used on the ith crop, and ei is a random variable representing production risk.  
Assuming a multiplicative representation of production uncertainty, the production function can 
be written: 
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Given initial land quality and other conditions, the major decisions each farmer faces at 
the beginning of a season are (1) the total area to plant, and (2) the fraction of planted area to 
allocate to each product.  Farmers can respond to changes in incentives by bringing new plots   7 
into production or leaving plots fallow, adjusting labor and other input use by crop, and adjusting 
land allocation among different crops.  The land constraint is: 
(8)  A A N
i
t i ∆ + ≤ ∑ 1 -  
such that the total land in production in period t is less than or equal to the area cultivated in the 
previous season plus the change in area between seasons.   
Incorporating the production function shown in equation (7), the current period profit 
function for on-farm activities can be written: 
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where wf represents the value of the farmers’ time spent working on the farm. 
Assuming price and yield risk are independent and defining expected prices as E(Pi)=qi 
and the variances of prices as var(Pi)=ji
2, expected profit can be written as  
(10)  ) - - - T - ) ( [ ) ( fi N p X p H w w Q E N i x fi h f
i
i i i å · = m q p  
and the expected variance of profits as: 
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which can be more conveniently written by replacing the expression within the rightmost 
parentheses with PVARi. 
In the case of separability (complete markets), production decisions affect consumption 
decisions through farm profits, but consumption decisions do not affect production decisions.  
Production is independent of household preferences about consumption and also independent of 
household income.  In this case, the household behaves as if it maximizes income subject to the 
production function constraint and then maximizes utility subject to the full income constraint.    8 
Because neither the value of endowed time nor exogenous non-labor income (V) are choice 
variables, maximizing full income is equivalent to maximizing the value of output less variable 
inputs (profits).  The assumption of complete markets is often used for studies in developed 
countries.  However, in the presence of risk, consumption and production decisions may not be 
separable where there are risk-averse farm households.     
The Lagrangian function here (using constraints separately rather than the combined full 
income constraint in order to be able to examine the off-farm employment participation decision) 
can be written as: 
(12)
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Applying Kuhn-Tucker conditions: 
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With positive off-farm work (To>0), m must equal 0 in order to satisfy equation (16).  In 
other words, households with off-farm work will allocate hours to off-farm work until the 
expected marginal utility of allocating additional time to off-farm work is zero.  Bardhan and 
Udry (1999) show that the first order conditions under risk imply that, at the optimum, the 
marginal product of household farm labor is less than the off-farm wage.  This differs from the 
case without uncertainty, where time would be allocated to farm labor until the marginal returns 
to farm labor were just equal to the off-farm wage, and will result in greater reliance on off-farm 
labor.  Because the income risk of working off-farm is less than work on-farm, a risk-averse 
household will allocate more of its labor to off-farm work to reduce risk, even though expected 
consumption is lower.   
If off-farm work is zero (To=0), then the optimality conditions have a different structure 
because m cannot be assumed to equal zero.  In this case the optimality conditions are that 
households will allocate hours to on-farm work until the expected marginal utility of on-farm 
labor is equal to the shadow price of leisure.  Of course, in the case of no off-farm employment, 
the off-farm wage rate does not exceed the shadow price of time spent farming.    10 
The labor force participation decision depends on the relative magnitudes of wo and wf.  
When variables that raise the off-farm wage rate or lower the shadow price of time spent farming 
are increased, then off-farm labor participation increases.  For instance, an increase in non-labor 
income is expected to increase the marginal value of leisure time, an increase in output price 
generally increases the value of time spent in farm work and an increase in input price lowers the 
shadow price of farm labor.   
The land area allocated to each crop is an increasing function of expected own-price and 
yield.  Cross-price and cross-yield effects are typically negative because acreage in one crop is 
generally a substitute for acreage in another crop, although there may be complementarities due 
to rotation patterns.  In addition, uncultivated land, if present on the farm, could be used to 
increase crop acreage.  Under risk neutrality, price and yield shocks should dominate the 
explanation of changes in total acreage planted and acreage allocation among crops over time.  
Land allocation by crop is invariant to own price and yield variability.  However, under risk 
aversion, the sign associated with own variance is unambiguously negative.  For positive price or 
yield shocks for a crop, risk-neutral farmers will expand area of that crop by more than risk-
averse farmers because an increase in production of a given crop increases the variance in 
income associated with that crop.  In addition, increasing variability of yields and/or prices is 
expected to increase the amount of time allocated to off-farm work.  As the returns to tobacco 
have declined in recent years, it is expected that farmers would respond by increasing the area 
devoted to alternative crops and spending more time working off-farm.   
The system of equations above can be used to obtain optimal values for Ni, Tl, To, Tfi, Hf, 
X, l, τ, and  .  Given observed data, we can construct a set of reduced form equations that 
provides a solution for the endogenous variables.  The focus here is on the allocation of land to  11 
tobacco vs. alternative enterprises and the allocation of time to off-farm work because we are 
interested in income diversification away from tobacco.   
Reduced form equations for econometric estimation can be written in the general form: 
(21)  ) , , , , , , , , ( = 1 -
2 2
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These equations were estimated empirically from several regressions. One used tobacco acreage 
grown (ACRESGROWN) as the dependent variable, Ni. Others employed probit regression and 
measures of To that are binary indicators of whether the farmer is actively searching for ways to 
diversify their operations or not (ACTIVE); whether respondents indicated finding ways to 
increase profits in any of their non-tobacco enterprises (INCPROFIT); and whether the farm 
household has off-farm income (OFFFARM).      
DATA 
The primary data source for this paper is a panel of North Carolina tobacco farmers.  The 
panel was drawn from 14 of the 15 counties that produce the most flue-cured tobacco in the state 
and surveyed in 1997, 1999, 2001, and 2004 to date.  Some of the questions in each of these 
surveys asked farmers for information about the previous two years.  Thus, we have observations 
for selected variables (e.g., tobacco acreage) for up to eight years.  There were 1,236 tobacco 
farmers in the initial sample, but there has been substantial attrition over time.  In the most recent 
survey, there were 535 farmers that responded to the survey and that continue to have tobacco-
related income.  These data were combined with secondary data on wages and crop prices and 
yields.    
The data used to implement the above model empirically fall into the following five basic 
categories (variables used in theoretical model section in parentheses):  12 
Household-specific Characteristics (Zh): Household preferences are not measured 
directly, so they are proxied using demographic and other variables expected to influence farm 
household preferences and managerial ability.  The variables used in the empirical analysis are 
age of household head3 (AGE); age of household head squared (AGESQ); dummy variables for 
household head educational attainment categories (less than high school (ED_LTHS), high 
school graduate (ED_HS), some college (ED_SOMECOLL), and college graduate 
(ED_COLLGRAD)); a dummy variable for household head gender (MALE); a dummy variable 
for household head race (WHITE); a dummy variable for household head tobacco use 
(TOBACCO), and a dummy variable indicating whether the household was in a county that 
received targeted information regarding opportunities to diversify away from tobacco from the 
Rural Advancement Foundation International and other partners (TX).  All of these variables 
were collected from survey respondents except for TX, which was assigned based on the county 
where the farm household was located. 
Resource Endowments (T, A): These variables measure the resources available to the 
landowner and include asset holdings such as land, labor, and wealth (proxied by income).4  The 
labor variables used to represent these characteristics include dummy variables for whether the 
household head is married (MARRIED) and whether they have children (CHILD), both of which 
are included to proxy additional time endowment for the household because the survey did not 
directly collect data on the number of members of each household and their ages.  Total acreage 
                                                 
3 For the purposes of this study, the household head is the person within the household that 
makes decisions regarding tobacco production.   
4 In the absence of capital constraints, wealth should theoretically not be an important 
determinant of landowner behavior.    13 
owned (TOTALLAND) was only collected in the 2004 survey and was assumed to be constant 
across the survey period.  Annual household income data was collected in ranges and is 
categorized for the purposes of this analysis into four categories, income less than $25,000 
(INC_LT25K), between $25,000 and $50,000 (INC_25TO50K), between $50,000 and $100,000 
(INC_50TO100K), and greater than $100,000 (INC_GT100K).   
Market Incentives (q q q q, wh, wo, px, r): This category includes factors explicitly related to 
exogenous economic determinants of decisions, such as prices, availability of markets, and 
infrastructure.  We used future harvest period tobacco prices to represent tobacco price 
expectations (Foreman, 2005).  Due to lack of cross-sectional price variation, we substituted 
expected revenue for prices based on multiplying the expected price by the yield reported by the 
survey respondents.  For those that did not report their yield, we used the average yield for 
respondents from that county.  ER_TOB is the expected tobacco revenue per acre.5    
To proxy for off-farm labor opportunities, we used the average wage per job for each 
county for each year (OFFFARM), downloaded from the BEA Regional Economic Accounts 
(BEA, 2005).  The 90-day T-bill rate (R) was used as a measure of investment opportunity costs.  
One of the most important input costs for tobacco growers is leasing quota.  We used lease prices 
reported by survey respondents for 2002 and 2003 and scaled them back to earlier years based on 
the national cost for land and quota divided by the average yield (Foreman, 2005).  This assumes 
that all lease rates were changing at the same rate while maintaining their distribution across 
                                                 
5 We also attempted to use World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates price projections 
(USDA NASS, 2005) for several major NC crops to capture crop substitution.  Analogous to 
the case for tobacco, we substituted expected revenue for prices.  However, in this paper we 
focus on the results with only tobacco price and variability included.     14 
particular farms.  For households that did not report a lease price (most of whom reported that 
they did not lease from or to others), we used the average of reported lease prices per pound for 
their county to represent the lease price that would have been available to them had they chosen 
to enter the quota lease market.     
Risk and Uncertainty (
2 2 σ , φ i i ): These variables reflect the uncertainty in the market and 
institutional environment under which decisions are made, primarily yield and price risk.  There 
has been relatively little variation in the tobacco price in recent years, due in large part to the 
programs in place to stabilize it.  The variance of the tobacco price over the period from 1995 to 
2003  was multiplied by the yield for each farm to provide a measure of variability in expected 
revenue due to price variability, holding yield constant (ERV_TOB).  This was used in order to 
have cross-sectional variation.  In addition, the variance of yield over the period from 1960 to 
2003 by county was used to represent the yield risk for that county (TOB_YVAR).   
Biophysical Factors ( ,  i ): This refers to influences on the physical production process 
associated with farming.  However, the farmer survey did not collect information on slope, soil 
quality, or other biophysical factors.  Consequently, we used tobacco yield reported by 
respondents to proxy soil quality for growing tobacco.  Yield information was not collected 
before the 2004 survey, so yield in previous years was assumed to be equal to the average of the 
yields reported in the 2004 survey for the 2002 and 2003 seasons.    
In addition to the variables described above, there are a number of existing or potential 
government policies that could influence landowner decisions.  These policies could enter 
through adjustments to expected prices (e.g., due to price supports), price variability (e.g., 
through price supports, crop insurance), or through dummy variables representing the presence 
of a policy.  Of course, the most important policy that may have affected decisions regarding  15 
tobacco production over this time period is the tobacco quota program.  Since these policies are 
all implemented at the national or market level, the only variation in them is over time. For this 
reason, we use time dummy variables to capture changes in quota and other policies.   
RESULTS 
Table 1 summarizes the data used for this analysis. Farmers were predominantly white 
(94%) and male (92%) with just over 50% having a high school diploma or less.  Most are 
married (87%) and have at least one child (92%).  Just over 50% worked off-farm; 45% reported 
making a profit on some crop other than tobacco; and two thirds (67%) indicated active attempts 
to diversify income.  Ages ranged from 19 to 92 years with average age just over 50 years.  
Forty-one percent report smoking.  Average farm size is around 300 acres, while acres of 
tobacco grown averages only 56 acres.  
The results of the regressions with tobacco acreage grown as the dependent variable are 
shown in Table 2.  Because some of the farmers in the sample lease out all of their quota and 
their tobacco acreage grown is censored at zero, we used a random effects Tobit model.  Because 
tobacco quota is an important constraint in this market, we estimated the equation both with and 
without including the total acreage owned because farms that are larger in size cannot necessarily 
increase their tobacco acreage more than small farms.  Although the signs on expected tobacco 
revenue (ER_TOB) and yield variance (TOB_YVAR) are opposite of what would be expected, 
off-farm wages, interest rates, and lease price coefficients show the anticipated response to 
changes in market conditions.  The dummy variables for survey years reveal a strong downward 
trend after 1999, reflecting the severe quota cuts that were implemented over that time.  Changes 
in coefficients when total land owned in 2004 is included suggest that this variable is highly 
correlated with being male, white, married, and having a college degree and at least one child.   16 
In addition to the tobacco acreage regressions, we also estimated probit models of efforts 
and success in diversification on-farm as well as participation in off-farm work.  Table 3 
summarizes the results, which do not always conform to expected results.  Responses to 
economic incentives generally appear quite weak in these regressions, although this may be a 
function of the data that we used to proxy expected prices facing farm households.   
Our results show that whether a farm household is actively attempting to identify 
opportunities for diversification (ACTIVE) is most strongly correlated with education level of 
high school graduate or above. This finding supports our conjecture that this variable may be 
associated with managerial acumen. The time dummies show that interest in diversification has 
increased relative to 1997, but has remained fairly constant in each successive year. The slight 
elevation in 2001 may reflect increased interest following the Master Settlement Agreement in 
1998 that raised prices and reduced demand. That interest may have been dampened by 2004 by 
Phase II payments and increased talk of a buyout which would have increased farmers’ 
incentives to continue to grow tobacco. This may explain why efforts to diversify are not 
strongly related to economic incentives in our results.  The second column of Table 3 contains  
coefficient estimates for the regression of diversification profitability.  There are few significant 
variables in this regression. Total acres of land owned is a positive predictor of profitability, 
while tobacco use is a negative predictor. One of the most interesting things in this regression is 
that the time dummy coefficients, which in 1999 and 2001 demonstrate a fairly uniform negative 
shift relative to 1997, nearly double in absolute magnitude in 2004. This would be consistent 
with increased expectations of a buyout plus receipt of Phase II payments which may have 
dampened farmer interest in identifying ways to increase profits on non-tobacco.    17 
Finally, in the OFFFARM model, we find age and age squared to be important 
determinants of whether the household derives income from off-farm sources, as expected.  
Education levels of high school graduate and above are also correlated with higher probability of 
having off-farm income, as is having at least one child. The difference in coefficients between 
individuals with some college and those with a college degree suggest that the former group are 
much more likely to work off-farm compared to those without a high school diploma than are 
those farmers who have a college degree. There are at least two possible explanations for this 
finding. Individuals with college degrees may be more risk neutral or, if they are risk averse, 
their additional managerial acumen may result in higher on-farm productivity and a higher off-
farm reservation wage. None of the economic variables is statistically significant in this 
regression.. 
DISCUSSION 
Changes taking place in tobacco markets have increased interest in identifying potential 
substitute income sources for tobacco farmers.  Our econometric findings suggest that farmers’ 
decisions about tobacco acreage grown  are shaped in expected ways by their economic 
opportunity set as measured by off-farm wages, tobacco quota lease prices, and interest rates. 
Our model predicted that this decision would also be affected by expected returns to tobacco and 
tobacco yield variance. The empirical results indicate that this is the case, but the signs of these 
effects are opposite of expectations.  This may be due in part to the imperfect measures of these 
variables available for this study, but may also reflect the impact that the potential quota buyout 
had on farmers over this period that was not entirely captured by the year dummies.  It is likely 
that some farmers stayed in tobacco longer than they would have otherwise in an attempt to be 
eligible for a tobacco buyout in the event one took place.  This may have made them less  18 
responsive to price and risk signals. However, this would not account for the opposite and 
significant effects detected here. There has been relatively little change in tobacco prices 
recently, but there has been a substantial increase in tobacco quota lease rates as quotas were 
reduced. If farmers’ responses to rising lease rates dominated responses to changes in output 
prices or its variability, this could account for the findings presented here.  Lease rates were a 
major input cost prior to the tobacco quota buyout and it is not surprising that they had a 
significant impact on tobacco acreage grown.   
The results suggest that farm households are becoming more interested in diversifying 
their income over time, but less successful in finding ways to accomplish that goal with 
alternative enterprises on farm.  Increased interest in diversifying is certainly consistent with 
market changes that have tended to signal the end of the tobacco price support system and 
increased foreign competition. The confounding influence of the impending tobacco quota 
buyout, which created incentives to grow tobacco in order to qualify for buyout payments, could 
account for some of the decrease in developing profitable alternatives and working off-farm over 
time that is observed. However, it is unlikely to be the full explanation. North Carolina also 
suffered sizable losses in manufacturing jobs between 2001 and 2004, thus restricting the 
opportunity set for off-farm employment. This has almost certainly translated into reduced 
demand for produce and other farm products, at least in local markets, which would in turn affect 
profitability. 
Researchers, agricultural development policymakers, and public health advocates have 
been working for decades to encourage development of value-added and specialty products that 
would enable farms to become diversified away from tobacco while maintaining or increasing 
their profitability.  Further post-buyout research is needed to sharpen estimates of tobacco  19 
farmers’ responsiveness to economic incentives.  A new version of the tobacco farmer survey 
will be fielded in late 2005 that will help to resolve questions about tobacco farmers’ actions 
once price supports are no longer in place and whether buyout funds are sufficient to enable them 
to develop new economic opportunities.     20 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for variables used in estimation 
Variable  Mean  Standard 
Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
ACRESGROWN  55.70  61.32  0  760 
ACTIVE  0.6764    0.4679  0  1 
INCPROFIT  0.4543    0.4980  0  1 
OFFFARM  0.5147  0.4998  0  1 
AGE  53.07  11.98  19  92 
AGESQ  2,959.68  1,311.65  361  8,464 
MALE  0.9230  0.2667  0  1 
WHITE  0.9412  0.2353  0  1 
ED_LTHS  0.1319  0.3385  0  1 
ED_HS  0.4146  0.4927  0  1 
ED_SOMECOLL  0.2381  0.4260  0  1 
ED_COLLGRAD  0.2154  0.4111  0  1 
TOBACCO  0.4075  0.4914  0  1 
MARRIED  0.8659  0.3408  0  1 
CHILD  0.9152  0.2786  0  1 
TOTALLAND  292.72  537.17  0  4,000 
ER_TOB  4,348.74  1,712.57  0  21,605.07 
ERV_TOB  103.05  40.09  0  468.69 
OFFWAGE  13.06  1.714  10.02  19.03 
P_LEASE  0.4874  0.2180  0.1469  2.6 
TOB_YVAR  191.97  22.16  151.63  230.36 
R  4.122  1.731  1.01  5.82 
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Table 2. Results for Tobit Regression of Tobacco Acreage Grown 
  (1)  (2) 
AGE  -0.4568*** 
(-4.94) 
-0.8525*** 
(-8.01)    
MALE  12.22*** 
(3.82)   
20.94*** 
(6.79)   
WHITE  5.131 
(1.50)    
42.04*** 
(11.93)    
ED_HS  6.254** 
(2.32)    
7.002** 
(2.28)    
ED_SOMECOLL  -0.4755 
(-0.18)    
3.758 
(0.90)        
ED_COLLGRAD  2.234 
(0.68)       
23.16*** 
(7.25)       
TOBACCO  -4.112** 
(-2.20)    
-8.891*** 
(-5.04)    
MARRIED  4.453** 
(1.97)    
10.96*** 
(3.71)       
CHILD  6.813** 
(2.39)    
17.99***  
(4.55)      
TOTALLAND04  0.05878*** 
(42.3)      
ER_TOB  -0.0003365 
(-0.52)    
-0.00272*** 
(-5.84)       
OFFWAGE  -2.309*** 
(-3.45)    
-1.544** 
(-2.36)     
R  -3.948*** 
(-2.92)     
-3.903*** 
(-2.65)    
P_LEASE  -8.348*** 
(-2.57)    
-6.220** 
(-2.14)       
TOB_YVAR  0.0287 
(0.68)    
0.2164*** 
(4.96)       
SYR99  4.639*** 
(3.10)    
3.090** 
(1.99)    
SYR01  -8.661*** 
(-5.06)    
-10.02*** 
(-6.04)       
SYR04  -29.92*** 
(-5.31)    
-31.72*** 
(-5.25)       
Intercept  84.67*** 
(5.27)    
33.39** 
(2.38)       
su 
45.54*** 
(67.6)       
59.24*** 
(68.42)       
se  27.82*** 
(78.8)    
30.35*** 
(80.02)    
r  0.7282                          0.7921                     
Note: Z-statistics are in parentheses.  Superscripts ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 
percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.  24 
Table 3. Results for Probit Regressions of Diversification Activities 






AGE  -0.000111 





AGESQ  -0.0000123 





MALE  -0.4830** 





WHITE  -0.3811 





ED_HS  0.5697*** 





ED_SOMECOLL  0.5692*** 





ED_COLLGRAD  0.6777*** 











MARRIED  0.4015** 





CHILD  -0.05487 





TOTALLAND04  0.0001364 
(1.27)    
0.0001761* 
(1.72)   
ER_TOB  0.0003486 





ERV_TOB  -0.01409 
(-0.87)        
OFFWAGE  0.02441 





P_LEASE  0.2800 





TOB_YVAR  -0.005506** 





SYR99  0.4545*** 





SYR01  0.5479** 





SYR04  0.4538 





Intercept  0.7460 












r  0.4371     0.3669  0.7868 
Note: Z-statistics are in parentheses.  Superscripts ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 
percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 